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


HISTORY  
OF  
USAID/SENEGAL

Andres Acedo  
USAID/Senegal

June 1995

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
# HISTORY OF USAID/SENEGAL

Andres Acedo  
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HISTORY  
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USAID/SENEGAL

VOLUME I OF II



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## HISTORY OF USAID/SENEGAL

### INTRODUCTION

This history of USAID/Senegal is a technical document written primarily for the use of development professionals, and is not intended for the non-specialized general public. It focusses essentially on what the U S assistance program to Senegal has tried to achieve, what were its overall goal, its objectives and specific targets, its varying emphases, strategies and technical approaches. It also attempts to briefly present findings drawn from evaluations and assessments, and lessons learned from programs and projects implemented over the years.

This history of USAID/Senegal will constitute a background document accompanying a series of in-depth sector assessments to be undertaken during 1995, in preparation for the next planning cycle of the U S assistance program to Senegal.

The history of USAID/Senegal may be useful to know to the extent that it helps to draw lessons of past experience that can guide future efforts. To that end, this document includes, in summary form, evaluation findings, portions of discussions presented in USAID planning documents, and objectives, strategies and targets set out in those documents - more details are presented for more recent years.

In order to better comprehend the history of USAID/Senegal, it may be useful to first present the history of U S foreign aid, starting with the period immediately preceding 1961, the year Senegal became independent, which is also the year USAID was created.

The involvement of USAID in Senegal should also be placed in the context of U S foreign policy interests, USAID program emphases, and prevailing development patterns, in USAID as well as in other donor organizations. These have evolved over the years, influencing the thrust and content of U S assistance to Senegal.

### THE HISTORY OF U S FOREIGN AID

The United States' assistance to developing countries began in 1949 when the "Point Four" program was launched under President Truman (1945-1953). Before that, special assistance programs had been launched to help other countries, in particular the Marshall Plan, which provided massive aid for the reconstruction of Western European countries ravaged by the Second World War.

In Africa, early U S interests in Sub-Saharan countries were shaped by the British presence on the continent (little is said in the documents of this period about French colonies). As British colonies moved toward independence, the United States stepped in to ensure a peaceful transition to Western-friendly governments. In that early

period, the few assistance activities that the United States undertook in Sub-Saharan Africa were managed by a Desk in the Europe Bureau of the International Cooperation Administration (ICA), USAID's predecessor agency. It was then believed that the assistance effort was only temporary.

In the 1950's, foreign assistance was characterized by a strong concern with security. The Cold War cast its shadow over U.S. assistance to Africa in these years. References to potential communist influence recur throughout ICA programming documents. By the mid-50's, economic and technical assistance had increased, but the effectiveness of U.S. foreign aid was already being questioned, increasing criticism was being voiced. Aid programs had not produced the hoped-for effects, the way aid was being given, as well as the way it was being received and used, were blamed.

# 1 President Kennedy and The Decade of Development

## A The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961

In 1961 President Kennedy launched the Decade of Development.

"For no objective supporter of foreign aid can be satisfied with the existing program - actually a multiplicity of programs. Bureaucratically fragmented, awkward and slow, its administration is diffused over a haphazard and irrational structure. The program is based on a series of legislative measures and administrative procedures conceived at different times and for different purposes, many of them now obsolete, inconsistent, and unduly rigid and thus unsuited for our present needs and purposes. Its weaknesses have begun to undermine confidence in our effort both here and abroad."

On September 4, 1961, the Congress passed the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA), in those days a relatively concise document, which in its Section 102(b) listed the principles to govern U.S. bilateral development assistance. Given below are some excerpts.

"(1) Development is primarily the responsibility of the people of the developing countries themselves. Maximum effort shall be made to stimulate the involvement of the people in the development process through the encouragement of democratic participation in private and local governmental activities and institution building appropriate to the requirements of the recipient countries."

"(2) United States assistance should be administered in a collaborative style to support the development goals chosen by each country receiving assistance."

Other principles governing U.S. development assistance included food production and

nutrition, rural development and generation of gainful employment, population planning and health, environment and natural resources, education, development administration, and human resources development, participation of women in the national economies of developing countries and improvement of women's status, participation of the private sector in carrying out development assistance, etc

The FAA, as originally enacted in 1961, contained very few restrictions on how assistance was to be provided, and only general prescriptions on the kinds of factors that were to be taken into consideration prior to the provision of assistance

Criteria used to assess the commitment and progress of recipient countries towards the FAA goals were straightforward increase in agricultural productivity per unit of land through small-farm, labor-intensive agriculture, reduction of infant mortality, control of population growth, promotion of greater equality of income distribution, etc

Two development assistance programs were primarily contemplated in the FAA a Development Loan Fund whose primary purpose was to foster plans and programs to "develop economic resources and increase productive capacities" (i.e., a significant amount of capital infrastructure), and a Development Grant Fund, to focus on "assisting the development of human resources through such means as programs of technical cooperation and development" in less developed countries

Three other significant economic assistance programs were included in the FAA (1) a guaranty program (now the Overseas Private Investment Corporation), (2) a supporting assistance program (now the Economic Support Fund), and (3) an appropriated contingency fund

#### B The Agency for International Development (AID)

By an Executive Order signed November 3, 1961, President Kennedy created the Agency for International Development (AID), which combined and supplanted the existing International Cooperation Administration (ICA) and the Development Loan Fund (DLF)

Among other organizational changes, the new agency created four Regional Bureaus, including one for Africa, which replaced the large technical offices, such as the Food and Agriculture Office

Two significant operational changes were also made One was the creation of the "no-year funding" category, particularly intended to remove "the pressure on AID personnel to enter into hasty obligations of funds prior to the end of the fiscal year or face the loss of funds" The other operational change was the creation of a research budget to address issues of worldwide importance in development



AID had a staff of 15,000 employees, of whom 13,000 were serving overseas and 2,000 in the U S. In the early 1960's AID bilateral programs expanded significantly. By 1965, the Agency had field Missions and programs in the majority of the newly independent Sub-Saharan nations in Africa.

Some quotes from AID Evaluation Special Study No. 54, "An Assessment of AID Activities to Promote Agricultural and Rural Development in Sub-Saharan Africa" set the stage for this period:

"The dominant development paradigm retained its emphasis on the need to spread existing technologies. The transfer and extension of U S agricultural technology continued to be regarded as the best way to ensure that the rural sector could contribute more to development. The assumption that available [U S] technology was relevant to situations in developing countries was only beginning to be questioned."

In response to the growing concern over the economic effects of foreign aid on the U S economy and its impact on U S trade, competition, and balance of payments, AID increasingly tied procurement to U S sources from about 47% in 1959, tied aid rose to 73% by 1962.

In Africa, concern with East-West relations continued to influence U S assistance programs.

## 2 The Vietnam War

The Vietnam War became an increasing burden on the U S Government budget, and AID felt the impact. To the central question of how foreign aid could be made more effective, AID attempted to respond in two ways: (1) Agency-wide, by introducing program loans, (2) in Africa, by reducing the number of bilateral programs and shifting to regional and multilateral programs.

AID Evaluation Special Study No. 54, already cited, explains the reasons for these two measures:

- The introduction of program loans in 1965 was intended to increase the effectiveness of aid without increasing funding levels. Apparently, many donors preferred to finance specific large projects. This preference encouraged developing countries to over-emphasize large-scale public sector projects, and to neglect small investment and the private sector.

Program loans would correct this tendency, it was hoped, by providing incentive for major improvement in self-help reforms and improved development policies. They would also provide the opportunity to review and agree on the countries' general

economic policies, often in conjunction with the International Monetary Fund and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. As of 1966, AID's new orientation emphasized greater attention to policy formulation, promotion of the private sector, institution building, and technology.

- U.S. assistance policy for Africa was profoundly affected by the recommendations of a report by Ambassador Edward Korry, which was 30 commissioned by President Johnson. Only 10 of the 33 Missions and field offices were allowed to stay in operation. The remaining 22 were phased out as projects underway were completed.

### 3 The New Directions and Basic Human Needs

In the early 1970's, the aid program was increasingly criticized in Congress, which saw it as a giveaway program producing few foreign policy results for the United States. In 1971, for the first time in U.S. foreign assistance history, the Senate rejected a foreign assistance bill for fiscal years 1972 and 1973. Disillusionment with AID's effectiveness was based in part on a growing body of studies showing that low-income groups were not benefiting from economic development efforts.

In 1973 the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 was amended by Congress, the amendment called for "New Directions" in development assistance to meet basic human needs. To extend assistance directly to the recipient nation's population, Congress replaced the old categories of technical assistance grants and development loans with new functional categories aimed at specific problems such as agriculture, family planning, and education.

The New Directions legislation of 1973 resulted in substantive changes in AID's policies and approaches, among which greater emphasis on project aid directly targeted to low-income groups and greater participation of beneficiaries in the identification of their needs, the design of solutions, and evaluation of results.

Programs in Africa were also changing. The retrenchment that AID had adopted in response to the Korry Report was being abandoned in the aftermath of the Sahelian drought of the early 1970s, and the regional approach was gradually replaced once again by a steadily increasing number of bilateral programs and Missions.

From AID Evaluation Special Study No. 54

"Toward the end of the Carter years [1977-1980] the limitations of the New Directions projects became more and more evident. Problems of project proliferation, recurrent costs, and excessive state control of markets and input supplies could not be ignored. These factors, and the looming economic crisis brought on by structural adjustment, world economic recession, and the renewal

of the Cold War all harbingered the changes that were to come to A I D under the Reagan Administration "

#### 4 U S Foreign Assistance in the 1980's

For U S foreign aid to Africa, the Reagan years saw a return to earlier approaches. According to the AID Evaluation Special Study No 54, there was renewed concern with the spread of communism, the role of private enterprise, and the development of trade and commercial links between the United States and the developing nations. Once again, AID was giving program assistance in hopes that African governments would make policy reforms. Institution building, particularly in connection with agricultural education, was once again in favor.

Also, with personnel levels cut back still further, the Agency could not continue its labor-intensive targeted project approach. Focusing on policy reforms through non-project assistance would enable AID to concentrate its remaining technical resources on the macroeconomic problems of developing countries. The expected policy improvements would create an environment more conducive to private-sector investments. Technology transfer and institution building would enable this process to proceed more rapidly and efficiently.

Money was shifted into the faster disbursing Economic Support Fund account to increase the flexibility of U S response to these needs. As for Africa, a separate economic assistance program was authorized by Congress in late 1987 to provide a one-account, flexible, source of development assistance: the Development Fund for Africa.

#### 5 U S Foreign Assistance in the 1990's

##### A Rewriting the Foreign Assistance Act

Beginning in late 1988, the House Foreign Affairs Committee began an examination of the foreign assistance program and the continued relevance of the Foreign Assistance Act. The product of the review was the Hamilton-Gilman Report, its findings restated many of the same themes that President Kennedy had attempted to address almost thirty years earlier.

The report's major recommendation was to repeal the FAA and start fresh with an act that was far more focused than current law. Attempts by the Committee to rewrite the legislation were unsuccessful.

In April 1991, the Administration transmitted to the Congress its comprehensive rewrite of the FAA. It was criticized for providing the Executive branch with too much discretion. Other attempts made by the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and the Administration to produce an

acceptable rewrite were unsuccessful as well

## B Strategies for Sustainable Development

With the end of the Cold War, the superpower competition was over. The FAA was amended to authorize economic assistance for the new independent states of the former Soviet Union, programs for Eastern Europe were authorized by the Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989.

In the late 1980's, USAID redefined its mission and charted a plan to achieve it, called the Strategy for Sustainable Development. Quoted from "Strategies for Sustainable Development", U.S. Agency for International Development, March 1994.

"The United States Agency for International Development was created in 1961 with two purposes in mind: to respond to the threat of communism and to help poorer nations develop and progress."

"With the end of the Cold War, the international community can now view the challenge of development directly, free from the demands of superpower competition."

"Serious problems of development will yield to effective strategies; this is a lesson of the last 30 years. Many poor nations have experienced unparalleled economic growth during this time."

"Why then is the issue of development so urgent now? It is no exaggeration to suggest that the challenges we face constitute potential global threats to peace, stability, and the well-being of Americans and people throughout the world."

"The threats come from a multitude of sources."

[These threats include continuing poverty of a quarter of the world's people, population growth and rapid urbanization, widespread inability to read, write, and acquire technical skills, new diseases and endemic ailments that overwhelm the health facilities of developing countries, environmental damage, often rising from population pressures, absence of democracy, anarchy, persistent autocracy and oppression.]

"These threats pose a strategic challenge to the United States. If we do not address them now, we shall have to pay dearly to deal with them later."

"To respond in a meaningful way, the United States must articulate a strategy for sustainable development. It must forge a partnership with the nations and the people it assists."

" To meet the challenges of the post-Cold War world, USAID will employ certain operational methods in all its endeavors support for sustainable and participatory development, an emphasis on partnerships, and the use of integrated approaches to promoting development "

" Thus, the fundamental thrust of USAID's programs will aim at building indigenous capacity, enhancing participation, and encouraging accountability, transparency, decentralization, and the empowerment of communities and individuals "

USAID will support programs in four areas Population and Health, Broad-Based Economic Growth, Environment, and Democracy and will continue to carry out its other traditional mandate providing emergency humanitarian assistance and disaster relief

USAID will work in three types of countries sustainable development countries, transitional countries, and countries requiring limited (USAID) presence

Senegal is in the first category, sustainable development countries, that is countries where USAID will provide an integrated package of assistance, based on an integrated country strategy that includes clearly defined program objectives and performance targets

## HISTORY OF USAID/SENEGAL

On May 13, 1961, in Washington, D C , His Excellency Karim Gaye, Minister of Planning, Development and Technical Cooperation for the Government of Senegal, and Mr Henry R Labouisse, Director of the International Cooperation Administration (ICA, predecessor of USAID) for the Government of the United States of America, signed the Economic, Financial, Technical and Related Assistance Agreement establishing the framework for the United States-Senegal development aid program

### 1 The Beginning of the Aid Program (1961-1970)

The bilateral assistance program began in 1961 with a modest General Program Support gift to mark Senegal's independence, followed in succeeding years by a number of projects in the areas of water resources development, seed improvement, rural extension, poultry research, construction of secondary schools (including a secondary school for girls in Dakar), and participant training

Program implementation during this first period was slow and shaky Of twenty-two projects given a title and a number, eight never materialized In some cases more than

a year elapsed between the signing of the Project Agreement and the actual implementation of the projects. In others, implementation was plagued with problems. Major chunks of money were left unused and finally deobligated.

However, it was in those early days that appeared the "ancestors" of some of the major projects supported by USAID/Senegal. Over the years, in 1963 USAID funds were provided to support research on rice and peanut production, in April 1964 an evaluation of rice production methods was conducted in the Senegal River valley, as early as March 1966, a USDA team conducted an in-depth study of the potential agricultural development of the Casamance Region. And it was in 1964 that the first long-term Senegalese participant trainee was sent to the U.S.

The U.S. Ambassador's Special Self-Help and Development Activities program began in 1965. Among the first projects supported by the program were M'Bour Women's Association Hand Dyeing, Sewing Machines for Peace Corps Social Centers, Oxygen Tent Equipment for Fandene and Pikine Dispensaries, etc.

By 1970, most of the early bilateral projects had been completed, and the bilateral program in Senegal was composed essentially of PL 480 Title II food donations and special self-help development activities. USAID assistance to Senegal under the bilateral program, from 1961 to 1970, totalled 33 million dollars, of which 14.8 million dollars was for project assistance, and 18.2 million dollars was under PL 480.

## 2 The Regional Aid Program (1970-1975)

In the wake of the Vietnam war, and Ambassador Korry's report, which caused foreign aid programs in Africa to be reduced, the bilateral program in Senegal came to an end, and future aid activities were shifted to regional programs.

Regional assistance programs to some twenty-two African countries were administered by USAID through its Central and West Africa Office of Regional Affairs (CWAORA), based in Dakar.

The CWAORA structure did not last long, and by 1972 was replaced by smaller sub-regional offices, still with the mandate to administer regional activities. Dakar became the base for the Regional Development Office (RDO) in charge of the Dakar Area Development Assistance Program, which covered activities in West African countries: Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Gambia.

Regional activities benefitting Senegal included projects undertaken with the Organization for the Development of the Senegal River Valley (OMVS), among which the Regional Livestock Development Project, the West Africa Regional Poultry Project, the Grain Stabilization Project, and projects undertaken with the West African Rice Development Association (WARDA), among which the Agriculture and Rural

## Development Project

USAID direct assistance to Senegal, essentially PL 480 food donations, from 1971 to 1974, totalled 16.4 million dollars, of which 3.2 million dollars for project assistance, and 13.2 millions dollars under PL 480

### 3 The Sahel Drought and Return of Bilateral Program (1975-1980)

A major drought struck the Sahelian countries in the late 1960's and early 1970's - the worst in 60 years. The international donor community provided massive amounts of food and humanitarian assistance (USAID contributed a total of 245.7 million dollars). In 1973 the Sahelian states, including Senegal, organized the Interstate Committee for the Fight Against Drought in the Sahel (CILSS). In 1976, the donors created the Club du Sahel to coordinate development efforts in the Sahel region.

The drought caused USAID to gradually abandon its regional approach in Africa and resume its bilateral assistance programs. In Senegal, USAID provided PL 480 drought relief in 1973: fifty thousand metric tons of sorghum on a bilateral basis, and an additional five thousand metric tons through the World Food Program (USAID became the major food donor to Senegal), it also provided 416,000 dollars to cover inland transportation costs.

That was the beginning of a second, enlarged, phase of United States-Senegal bilateral cooperation. At the same time that drought relief was being provided to Senegal, a review of the situation was undertaken to identify the needs and areas of privation which could be addressed by short term project activities. Projects totalling 2 million dollars were launched in 1974, in the areas of village wells construction, rehabilitation of livestock watering points, reforestation, equipment for farmers, and medicines. This program ended in 1976.

As a follow-on to these short-term activities, projects were developed to help alleviate the adverse effects of the drought, and prevent the recurrence of the drought conditions found in 1973. Projects implemented during this phase were financed by a special congressional appropriation of 85 million dollars for the Sahel which was authorized in 1974.

During this time, USAID was defining its strategy to assist the Government of Senegal to reach the rural areas with development programs and to achieve food self-sufficiency. Projects were designed in the mid-1970's to introduce improved agricultural technical packages in dryland farming areas of the Peanut Basin, to develop irrigated agriculture in the Senegal and Casamance River Basins, to improve livestock and range management in the pastoral zones of northern and eastern regions of the country, and to establish rural health delivery systems.

In the late 1970's a number of major projects were launched in the agriculture sector the Grain Storage Project (685-0209) in FY 77, the Casamance Regional Development Project (685-0205) and the Bakel Small Irrigated Perimeters Project (685-0208) in FY 78, the SODESP Livestock Production Project in FY 79, the Cereals Production Project, Phase II (685-0235) in FY 80. In the health sector the Sine Saloum Rural Health Care Project (685-0210) and the Family Health Care Project (685-0217) in FY 79. In training SAED Training Project (685-0218) in FY 78, and YMCA/ORT Youth Job Development Project in FY 79.

USAID assistance during the period 1975-1980 totalled 81.1 million dollars, of which 47.4 million dollars for project assistance, 32.2 million dollars under PL 480, and 1.5 million dollars under regional programs.

#### 4 The Joint Assessment of USAID's Program (1980)

In preparation for its second five-year cycle of assistance to Senegal, USAID proposed to the Minister of Plan and Cooperation, in November 1979, to jointly assess the USAID program in Senegal of the preceding five years (1975-1979). This exercise, inspired by the new trends of U.S. foreign assistance (focus on policy reform, shift from project to non-project assistance), was considered important at a time Senegal was experiencing a very difficult economic situation.

The assessment, conducted in February-May 1980 by a Working Group made up of representatives of the Ministry of Plan and USAID, consisted of (a) an evaluation of projects undertaken in the four principal areas of USAID activities in Senegal (dryland farming, irrigated agriculture, livestock, and village health), and (b) an analysis of the entire contemporary economic context in which USAID/Senegal operated and which it would seek to address.

Upon completion of both tasks, the Working Group submitted a report to the Joint Assessment Management Committee, composed of representatives of the U.S. and Senegalese Governments. The purpose of the report was to assist the Management Committee in "understanding both the process and problems related to current programs and to use this knowledge in defining the broad outlines for the joint planning of future U.S. assistance programs to Senegal."

##### A The Findings of the Joint Assessment

Taken from the executive summary of the report, dated July 1980

"1 In a time of economic constraint and partial restructuring of the economy, the priority of USAID development assistance should be towards increasing productivity, especially in the rural sector. This also implies a renewed stress on improving the organization and management of Senegal's physical, natural



and human resources and an emphasis on the training of rural residents for the construction and maintenance of rural infrastructure and new productive assets "

"2 The USAID program in Senegal has been responsive to the needs of food self-sufficiency and self-sustained development. However, it needs at this point to more sharply concentrate its sectoral activities and strive toward building linkages between individual projects and the macro-economic and social needs of Senegalese society "

"3 Many of the difficulties encountered in the process of project implementation are due to the non-involvement of beneficiaries in the original design, and to their lack of participation in the management of project resources and service components. Remedial steps in the process of project design and in the timely training of beneficiaries to assume their responsibilities must be planned and undertaken "

"4 USAID can improve the efficiency of its program by designing more flexible assistance projects by means of increased use of local currency along with the greater involvement of the beneficiaries "

The report presented a series of recommendations for the purpose of establishing a more collaborative mode of planning, implementing, and evaluating projects and programs in Senegal

#### B The Project Evaluations

Four projects were evaluated under the joint assessment: the Cereals Production Project, Phase I (685-0201), the Bakel Small Irrigated Perimeters Project (685-0208), the Eastern Senegal Range and Livestock Project (685-0202), and the Sine Saloum Rural Health Care Project (685-0210). The major conclusions of the project evaluations were

"1 In difficult environments such as in Senegal, all projects are prototypic and should be explicitly recognized as such. This means that an emphasis must be placed on data collection and analysis so that a project may be carefully monitored and conclusions drawn from the project experience. There must be the flexibility to change elements of the project which are not working "

"2 The beneficiary surveys show that the local people involved support the projects, and their objectives. Much more needs to be done, however, to include the local population in the design and management of these and future projects "

"3 Public Sector institutions, especially the RDA's [Regional Development Agencies], have been the predominant focus of project efforts. This strategy must be reviewed. Expansion of development activities to other public and non-public institutions, particularly at the local level, should be undertaken."

"4 A I D projects are experiencing considerable managerial difficulties. As a result, most are behind schedule. Certain problems are chronic: long delays in the opening of special bank accounts for project funds, delays in receiving customs clearances already assured under the A I D bilateral agreement with Senegal, problems in obtaining qualified, French-speaking U S personnel, delays in the procurement, delivery, and repair of U S origin equipment, long delays in local contracting procedures. Both the Government and A I D must devote greater attention to identifying and eliminating or minimizing the typical causes of these costly blockages."

"5 The economic productivity of the projects is proving lower than anticipated. Some technical production packages are questionable. Senegal's ability to meet recurrent costs has been generally overestimated. A great deal more thought needs to be given to ways in which A I D resources may (a) stimulate local productive forces, both on and off-farm, and (b) help to build institutions whose social value equals or exceeds the amounts spent to maintain them."

"6 A I D has worked virtually exclusively via project grants. This is too restrictive given the dimensions of Senegal's economic problems."

### C Pointers for the Future

"What the assessment highlighted is that the present low productivity of Senegal's capital and labor resources is at the heart of Senegal's development problem. Further, the assessment has shown that, both on the side of the economic evaluation and on that of the USAID project themselves, there are limitations in relying exclusively upon public or parastatal agencies to carry out development activities."

"A major conclusion of the project evaluations, though hardly unique to Senegal, was that without adequate incentives, training, and responsibility, local populations will not carry forward project activities, much less propagate them. For this to happen, local populations - the beneficiaries themselves - must play a key part in the design and administration of their projects. Training, the evaluation stressed, in addition to incentives and delegation of authority, is very important to true local participation and cannot be ignored."

"In a larger sense, as well, the economic assessment underlined the importance of reducing our reliance on public services - subsidized credit and government

extension services, for example - to increase rural production. More needs to be understood about how less regulated markets work for credit, inputs and crop sales. More needs to be known about how these markets might be used as instruments of development policy in Senegal. In the same way, cooperatives need to be formed around activities which the farmers really want to do together."

"Thus, ways must be found, and urgently, to begin building from the bottom, to create an environment conducive to the emergence of decentralized rural institutions and to the greater 'ownership' of projects and programs by the people for whom they are intended."

"AID projects, it appears, are too insular, too inward-looking and self-contained. The projects do not appear to be part of an overall strategy in which all the various donors relate and exchange information. But this self-contained quality of AID project assistance may also be a limitation of AID's log-frame design concept. AID, the assessment suggests, should perhaps look beyond project goals to the adequacy of projects to meet national demands."

"The assessment, in this way, raised fundamental questions about the purpose and adequacy of the project approach when faced, as here, with a national economic emergency. Projects appear from this assessment to assume their true importance chiefly as prototypes, on the growing edge of the economy, pointing the way towards better ways of organizing irrigation, managing the range, treating the sick. Their time pay-out is never in the short or even medium terms. Faced with these difficulties, however, shouldn't projects be supplemented with another kind of aid - one, if possible, which could make even the projects themselves impact more effectively?"

The second phase of the year-long GOS/USAID effort of assessment and planning began in the summer of 1980 with the commissioning of a number of reports and papers as basic resources materials, which were discussed in a workshop held in December, 1980. Based upon the conclusions of the workshop, USAID/Senegal drafted its Country Development Strategy Statement (CDSS) for the period 1983-1987.

##### 5 The U S Assistance Strategy for the Period 1983-1987

The assistance strategy proposed in the new CDSS was as follows

- Maintain the long-range goal of food self-sufficiency, defined in the broadest sense as Senegal's achievement of the capacity to feed its people, by domestic production and storage and by trade, even in drought years
- The pursuit of this goal required that USAID/Senegal follow two

complementary program paths. The first, in agriculture, would aim at increasing and diversifying production and trade. The second, in human development, would seek to assure improved nutrition and general access to family health facilities, in order to support production efforts and reduce fertility rates.

The Agriculture Program would address four main targets:

a. Progressive decontrol and commercialization of rural production. USAID/Senegal would contribute to the activation of the farmers groups, encourage and enable GOS to withdraw from direct rural management, and promote artisanal small enterprises.

b. Development of more effective agricultural practices. USAID/Senegal would provide support to GOS' overall plan to decentralize and reform the agriculture research system, crop research (rice, corn, and wheat), an experiment to test techniques for transforming millet for the urban market, the application of economic and social analysis to production, research on the role of livestock in Senegal's future production scheme, extension and agricultural education.

c. Increase of cultivated land. USAID/Senegal would support the increase of cultivated land in the Fleuve and Casamance Regions, and the study and exploitation of groundwater resources for habitation and irrigation in these two regions.

d. Effective resource management. USAID/Senegal would take the lead with GOS in organizing a concerted multi-donor reclamation operation in the Peanut Basin, would experiment in the Sine Saloum with labor-intensive public work schemes, support the integration of livestock production in the Peanut Basin, and organize within the Sine Saloum zone a working body of PVO's (American and Senegalese), together with the Peace Corps.

The Human Development Program would address three main targets:

a. Achievement of an effective food/nutrition strategy. USAID/Senegal would support GOS in the preparation of a national food investment and supply strategy.

b. Improved access to primary health care. USAID/Senegal would continue to support on-going health efforts, pending a review with GOS of health sector needs to be undertaken in 1981, it would start with support to family planning services in facilities with well-equipped MCH services.

A CDSS Supplement submitted in 1982 described the four targets for the period 1983-1987 in the health sector:

- Establishment in the Sine Saloum Region (now Fatick and Kaolack Regions)

of a model rural health care delivery system, at least partially self-financing and capable of providing simple preventive and curative services, including family planning and nutrition surveillance and counseling at the village level

- Formulation by GOS of a national population policy, which would support the expansion of Maternal Child Health and Family Planning services in urban centers and the departmental health centers of the Sine Saloum, Thies, and Casamance Regions

- Development of a national nutrition policy, based upon a well coordinated process of nutrition planning and analysis at the national level, and linked to nutrition surveillance and counselling services in the Sine Saloum Region

- Testing of simple, affordable systems for monitoring and controlling water-borne diseases in irrigated perimeters in the Casamance and Fleuve Regions

c Enhance the social and economic standing of women USAID/Senegal would introduce a specific women's orientation within each of its health and production programs, thus phasing out individual WID actions in favor of integrated activities within large programs

Although the long-range goal (food self-sufficiency) remained the same as in the 1975-1980 assistance cycle, significant changes would be introduced in the way the assistance program would be implemented

- USAID/Senegal recommended the establishment of a Consultative Group, composed of GOS and the principal donors, to mobilize maximum assistance for the implementation of Senegal's Reform Plan (Plan de Redressement) and monitor its implementation

- Greater emphasis would be placed on non-project assistance in order to accelerate the transfer of U S resources to Senegal, provide support for Senegal's economic reform plan, and generate local currencies for a more flexible design and implementation of technical assistance activities

- Local currency proceeds would be used to train and equip selected producers' groups, cooperatives and community councils

- USAID/Senegal activities would be consolidated from five geographic areas (Sine Saloum, Casamance, Senegal River Basin, Ferlo and Thies/Diourbel) into three (Sine Saloum, Casamance, Senegal River Basin, considered to have the greatest potential), and the number of projects reduced from 30 to 15 by 1985

- USAID activities in the Senegal River Basin region would be combined into

one program, the Integrated Development of the Senegal River Basin (625-0621), subsequently renamed Senegal River Basin Planning and Policy Development

- Increased emphasis would be brought on the importance of nutrition as the central factor linking agricultural production and human development, with particular attention on basic human needs, especially in maternal and child health

- Greater care would be taken to situate USAID's family planning assistance within a well prepared, GOS-directed population strategy, with substantial support from other donors

- There would be increased stress on the role of Senegalese women within the context of each major project

The management strategy proposed to carry out the program had three principal objectives

- Increase the efficiency and rate of project implementation by concentrating USAID programs in three geographic areas, working increasingly through PVOs and the Peace Corps

- Reduce costs and increase continuity by upgrading the capabilities of non-American personnel through a local staff development program

- Move toward more simply designed activities which could be executed with a different level of expertise, terminate or accelerate close-out of projects

A CDSS update prepared in January 1983 further outlined the four principal vehicles USAID/Senegal would use to attain the targets set forth in the CDSS policy dialogue, institutional development, private sector, and technology transfer, in the framework of Senegal's Plan de Redressement

Two subjects, though, dominated the USAID/Senegal agenda in 1983-1984 Senegal's continuing financial crisis, and its dramatic food deficit, especially given its long term implications for Senegal's economy Both troubled areas involved the Mission in frequent, even daily, contact with Senegal's chief policy makers and with the other donors

1984 was a year of reevaluation and analysis by the GOS and the donor community In the spring, GOS issued its New Agricultural Policy (NAP), developed jointly with its major donors (including USAID), which called for (a) reduction of the role of the rural development agencies, (b) increased efficiency in the supply of agricultural inputs, (c) alternative production strategies, (d) more financing for rural development and (e) environmental protection

In December 1984 GOS presented to its Paris Consultative Group the Medium and Long Term Economic Program (Action Plan), a structural adjustment program designed to restore fiscal and financial equilibrium, and to lay the groundwork for a development program which would promote real growth

USAID/Senegal also reassessed its strategy, three studies were undertaken in 1984 the Agriculture Sector Policy Analysis, the Credit and Savings Study, and the Fertilizer Marketing Study

During the period 1981-1985 the following major projects were undertaken the Agricultural Research and Planning (685-0223) and the National Plan for Land Use and Development (685-0233) Projects in FY 81, the ENEA Rural Management Training Project (685-0256) in FY 82, the Rural Health Care, Phase II (685-0242) and the Community and Enterprise Development (685-0260) Projects in FY 84, the Family Health and Population (685-0248), the Irrigation and Water Management (685-0280) and the Transfer of Technology (685-0281) Projects in FY 85

As for non-project assistance, 1983 was the first year Senegal received ESF funds 5 million dollars under an Agriculture Development Assistance Grant to import fertilizers Three direct cash transfers followed 5 million dollars in FY 83 (ESF I), 10 million dollars in FY 84 (ESF II), and 15 million dollars in FY 85 (ESF III)

U S assistance to Senegal during the period 1981-1985 totalled 225.9 million dollars, of which 90.3 million dollars for project assistance, 30 million dollars for non-project assistance, 70.6 million dollars under PL 480, and 35 million dollars for regional (including OMVS/OMVG) programs

## 6 The U S Assistance Strategy for the Period 1986-1990

In February 1985 the Mission issued a new CDSS, covering the period 1986-1990 However, in the late 1980's, the Agency redefined its mission and charted a plan to achieve it, called the Strategy for Sustainable Development, in 1988, USAID/Senegal refocused its program along the lines of the new strategy

### A The 1986-1987 Period

In the February 1985 CDSS, the long-range goal of food self-reliance remained unchanged The short-term objective was a positive per capita rate of increase in the Gross Domestic Product, through the interaction of efforts in support of three subsidiary targets (a) an improved economic performance, in large part resulting from structural reform, (b) a minimum 5 percent increase per year in cereals production resulting from adequate provision of inputs, water and marketing, and (c) a decrease in the fertility rate from 48/1000 to 42/1000, derived from family planning efforts

"United States' assistance for the past ten years has focused on geographic area development and primary health care programs. GOS adoption of the New Agricultural Policy makes many of these programs obsolete, therefore, we propose a new generation of activities designed to effectively (a) develop technology, (b) transfer technology to farmers and rural enterprises, and (c) support production expansion through free market structures. These new programs will help provide the technical tools needed to fully implement the NAP. Simultaneously many of the earlier generation of projects in USAID's portfolio are both producing research results and coming to an orderly close, thus clearing the deck for more knowledgeable support of the GOS reform and development plan."

"One major effort, through all our programs and projects, during the CDSS period, will be to stimulate a major change in the 'idea' structure. The Senegalese bureaucracy and policy-makers have as their heritage the statist, socialist (government can do everything best) mindset inherited from European social philosophers and consistent with African social values. If the economy is to grow and develop, then this mindset will have to change."

Much of the strategy contained in the previous CDSS was considered to be still valid. The most significant changes proposed in the new CDSS were (a) emphasis on removing structural constraints which impede the growth of agricultural production (rather than on area-specific interventions), (b) greater emphasis on income generation in the rural sector, (c) the launching of an important program of reforestation and soil regeneration, based largely on pilot efforts of previous years, and (d) a reduced emphasis on public sector institutional growth.

The U.S. assistance strategy proposed in February 1985 would concentrate on

1. Support for structural reform, through non-project assistance (multi-year Economic Support Fund and PL 480 Title I programs, subordinated to and conditioned on key systems reforms and follow-through performance factors), and some technical assistance.

2. Support to reduce institutional and infrastructural constraints which impede the growth of agricultural production, through technology transfer, support to the amelioration of the cereals marketing environment and the public-to-private sector transition of this activity, improvement of the methods used by the Senegalese agricultural research network to transfer technology, and support to expand irrigated production.

3. Support for income generation and environmental protection, by stimulating the creation of small enterprises in the rural areas and by supporting large scale programs of reforestation and agroforestry.



4 Support for rural health programs, including family planning and maternal/child health programs

A key aspect of the entire program, underlying each of these four elements, would be the continuation and intensification of donor dialogue

During the CDSS period the Mission would also attempt to broaden its knowledge in key areas of the economy such as constraints to a greater role for the private sector. Other areas for study and analysis would be alternative cash crops to peanuts, vegetable production and processing for export, greater use of existing resources and enterprises which can capture increased value added, using available labor and management, business management and technical trades, agricultural enterprises, rural programs of literacy and numeracy.

Cutting across the elements of the strategy, the Mission would continue and expand its cooperation in project implementation with PVOs and Peace Corps, and the private sector.

New projects launched during the 1986-1987 period were the Reforestation Project (685-0283) in FY 86 and the Agricultural Production Support Project (685-0269) in FY 87.

In addition, USAID participated in locust control activities in August 1986, grasshoppers threatened approximately 1.2 million hectares of agricultural land in Senegal. USAID, the donor community, and GOS launched a major aerial and ground spraying program. USAID contributed approximately 2.5 million dollars for aerial spraying operations and for entomologists assisting the GOS to fight the infestation. In 1987, USAID contributed 2 million dollars to further strengthen GOS' capability to respond to similar threats in the future.

Non-project assistance was in the form of cash transfers to support the GOS structural adjustment program. In addition to ESF, a new program, the Africa Economic Policy Reform Program (AEPRP) provided technical assistance and funds (cash transfer) to support a package of tax reforms being undertaken by GOS. Total ESF and AEPRP assistance: 26.5 million dollars in FY 86 (ESF IV and AEPRP I), and 11.5 million dollars in FY 87 (ESF V).

#### B The 1988-1990 Period

In line with the redefinition of USAID's mission and its new plan to achieve it (the Strategy for Sustainable Development), the Mission refocused its program. The Action Plan of April 1988 rephrased its strategy, objectives and priorities for the remainder of the CDSS period, establishing revised strategic objectives, targets and benchmarks for the period March 1988-March 1990.

"The goal of U S assistance to Senegal is to increase per capita growth and food security through an orderly process of financial stabilization, structural reform, and carefully selected project activities in the key areas of agriculture, natural resources, health, and family planning "

"The U S assistance strategy gives priority to assisting the Government of Senegal to (1) develop and implement reforms at the macroeconomic level, in agriculture, and in family health, (2) reduce institutional, infrastructural, and environmental constraints to the growth of agricultural production, and (3) expand delivery of health, nutrition, and family planning services that increase human productivity and the quality of life "

"Our policy agenda focusses on the following areas (1) improved fiscal performance and allocation of resources to productive sectors, (2) restoration of liquidity and reform of the banking sector, (3) implementation of a coherent strategy for reasonable food self-reliance, (4) reduction in the role of agricultural parastatals, (5) privatization of agricultural input distribution, (6) liberalization of cereals marketing, and (7) development of a replicable model of self-supporting, community-based primary health care that includes comprehensive programs of child survival and voluntary family planning "

"Our project assistance to agriculture emphasizes (1) extension of low-cost irrigation and water management techniques, (2) expansion of reforestation and conservation activities, (3) promotion of private production and marketing of agricultural inputs and outputs, and (4) strengthening of agricultural research and technology, especially in support of cereals-based farming systems in both rainfed and irrigated areas "

"Our project assistance in family health emphasizes improved child survival through immunization, oral rehydration and improved nutrition, and expanded family planning primarily through increased child spacing

For purposes of improved measurability and simplified tracking, the USAID strategy would seek to achieve three strategic objectives

"1 Promote a dynamic market economy Our efforts to promote a dynamic market economy emphasize restoration of stability in the budget and balance of payments accounts through rigorous short-term management of overall demand, and through medium to long-term structural reforms in government, agriculture and industry Such structural reforms must be based to a large extent on a reduction in the role of government in the overall economy, and on an expansion of the role of the private sector in production, marketing and pricing decisions USAID's principal macroeconomic policy targets include (1) reducing the budget deficit by limiting government expenditures and by

mobilizing domestic resources, (2) reducing the balance of payments deficit through trade and industrial policy reform, and (3) increasing credit availability and improving credit allocation through a reduction of government arrears and through banking sector reform "

"2 Increase Cereals Production The objective of U S assistance to agriculture is to increase cereals production by (1) encouraging liberalized marketing and remunerative floor prices, (2) by promoting private production and marketing of agricultural inputs and outputs, (3) by extending low-cost water management technologies, (4) by expanding reforestation and conservation activities, and (5) by strengthening agricultural research and technology "

"3 Improve Family Health The third objective of U S assistance to Senegal is to improve family health, especially in rural areas, largely through efforts to increase child survival and to reduce the birth rate Our child survival interventions emphasize immunization, oral rehydration, and improved nutrition, while our family planning interventions currently emphasize increased child spacing Improvements in health and family planning coverage rest on the possibilities for developing low-cost, preventive, community-supported, or private sector delivery mechanisms "

The Action Plan assessed the role played by U S assistance

1 On the policy dialogue front, USAID, along with other key donors, had played a significant role in helping the GOS to formulate, implement, and finance economic reforms required to stabilize the economy and to stimulate renewed growth

a ESF programs II-V (49 million dollars), with their focused conditionality, supported key reforms such as restructuring the peanut industry, privatizing fertilizer distribution, phasing down parastatals, liberalizing internal cereals marketing, and dampening rice imports The resulting local currency generations had directly supported increased liquidity by reducing government payments arrears to the private sector and to the banking system

b The policy dialogue associated with the PL 480 Title I programs for FY 86 and 87 (totalling 19.5 million dollars) was instrumental in liberalizing local cereals marketing, in establishing a cereals floor price, and in sustaining the gradual elimination of fertilizer subsidies The local currency proceeds supported the cereals floor price mechanism, helped liquidate arrears to the banking system, and helped finance the final phase-down of the fertilizer subsidy

c The 15 million dollar AEPRP was initiated in 1986 to support the New Industrial Policy launched by GOS This program helped GOS rationalize the tax and tariff system and improve the mobilization and allocation of domestic resources The

GOS progressively lowered and simplified import duties, and started the revision of the General Tax Code. Discussions were also initiated to implement banking sector reforms.

2 The project portfolio was realigned to better implement strategy objectives, reducing the number of active projects from 47 in 1984 to 12 in 1988, phasing out lower priority activities, and developing new projects (Agricultural Production Support, Reforestation) designed to increase the capacity of farmers and businessmen to take fuller advantage of the more liberal, market-oriented policy environment.

a Agricultural Research The Agricultural Research and Planning Project (685-0223) helped establish a program of applied economics which supplied policy makers with more than two dozen relevant papers on cereals marketing, input marketing, production economics, and rural institutions. These papers influenced the policy debate on the liberalization of both cereals marketing and input marketing, and assisted policy makers to assess the progress and impact of liberalized marketing processes.

b Locust Control The aerial and ground spraying operations and U.S. entomologists assisting the GOS to fight the infestation were instrumental in averting major crop losses in the vulnerable regions of Louga and Mbacke. The effectiveness of the U.S. response gained the U.S. enhanced respect.

c Family Health An evaluation of the Rural Health Services II Project (685-0242) documented the progress made in establishing an improved village-level primary health care system in the Sine Saloum region. Results achieved included increased acceptance of decentralized planning, improved drug supply management, increased user financing, and increased private sector involvement.<sup>1</sup>

d Family Planning The Family Health and Population Project (685-0248) demonstrated significant progress in providing access to family planning services, with a corresponding increase in contraceptive use. Project resources were also successful in increasing the role of the private sector in the delivery of family planning services: private pharmacies were distributing family planning supplies.

3 Private sector initiatives The entire program supported an expanded role for the private sector in an increasingly market-oriented economy. The Mission used

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<sup>1</sup> On March 30, 1995 Kemo Balajo and Andres Acedo, USAID/Senegal, visited two health posts in the Kaolack Region and interviewed the nurse Chef de Poste. In Saly all the health huts stopped their operations in 1990; in Maca-Yop only two health huts are still functioning (the facilities of the other ten are used from time to time for vaccination campaigns).

ESF conditionality, Title I self-help measures, and local currencies to accelerate GOS implementation of market liberalization and parastatal withdrawal from production and marketing activities. Local currencies were also utilized to accelerate repayment of GOS arrears to the banks and to private sector firms, many with less than 50 employees.

Tangible results were achieved. Some examples: approximately three-quarters of fertilizer distribution was by 1988 in the hands of the private sector, GOS subsidies to peanut oil crushing firms were eliminated, GOS subsidy on peanut seeds was phased out, all restrictions were lifted regarding storage and internal movement of local cereal products, allowing private merchants and producers freer access to markets, the Community and Enterprise Development Project (685-0260) provided credit to small-scale, non-farm enterprises, and its 97 percent repayment rate, demonstrating the feasibility of delivering credit on a self-sustaining basis to small and medium-scale firms.<sup>2</sup>

New projects launched during the 1988-1990 period were the Program Development and Support (685-0294) and the Southern Zone Water Management Projects (685-0295) in FY 88, and the PVO/NGO Support Project (685-0284) in FY 90.

Non-project assistance: 25 million dollars in FY 89 (ESF VI and VII), and 26.5 million dollars in FY 90 (AEPRP II).

U.S. assistance to Senegal for the two sub-periods 1986-1987 and 1988-1990 totalled 236.2 million dollars, of which 94.7 million dollars for project assistance, 88.3 million dollars for non-project assistance, 43.2 million dollars under PL 480, and 10 million dollars for regional programs (including OMVS/OMVG).

#### 7 The U.S. Assistance Strategy for the Period 1992-1997

In 1990 the Mission began preparing for the next planning cycle, 1992-1997. Sector analyses were undertaken in health, agriculture, education, natural resource management, private sector enterprise, employment, women in development, and macroeconomics. The results of these analyses served as the basis for the new country strategy document, now called the Country Program Strategic Plan (CPSP), prepared in accordance with the mandate of the newly established Development Fund for Africa.

The CPSP for 1992-1997 was issued in February 1991. It describes the program goals, strategic objectives and targets which guide USAID/Senegal's work. It is currently being revised and adjusted.

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<sup>2</sup> In March 1995, the repayment rate was almost 100 percent.

### A Lessons Learned

The CPSP describes a number of misconceptions and errors committed in the past

- The long-term goal of USAID/Senegal has been to increase per capita income and food security through an orderly process of financial stabilization, structural reform, and project activities in broad areas of agriculture, natural resources, health, and family planning. However, "financial stabilization alone, and the limited structural adjustment that has occurred to date, are insufficient to move Senegal onto a significantly higher growth path. Moreover, financial stabilization and structural adjustment are very broad goals which are beyond USAID's manageable interest operating on its own."

- USAID has long sought to achieve three major objectives: (a) to promote a dynamic market economy, (b) to increase cereals production, and (c) to improve family health. However, USAID has concluded that these objectives were also too broad.

- (1) The previous objective of assisting the GOS to achieve 80 percent food self-sufficiency was too broad, and was out of reach.

- (2) Previous approaches "failed sufficiently to focus on the negative effects of increasing cereals production in the short run without sufficient regard to maintaining a solid base of soil productivity, and also failed to focus on the complex and shifting production and employment strategies which rural households adopt to maximize income from available resources."

- (3) Both GOS and USAID placed too much emphasis on increasing rice production in the Senegal River valley, this "has proven to be a high-cost approach whose primary constraint is not land or water, but capital, management, and entrepreneurship."

- (4) USAID was involved in too many geographic areas and too many activities (from agricultural production, to cereals pricing, to water buffalo traction, to salt water distillation) to effectively manage and provide measurable impacts.

- (5) Although family planning remains inextricably linked with maternal and child health activities, there is a need to focus on those elements most closely related to decreasing family size.

### B The New Approach

From the CPSP Executive Summary

"Rapid population growth and a deteriorating natural resource base threaten the accelerated economic growth that is essential to the maintenance of Senegal's traditionally open, democratic, and stable society. USAID/Senegal has concluded that accelerated growth is a central issue and that population growth and environmental degradation are long-term development problems that must be addressed in Senegal now."

"Senegal must begin now to reach a balance between its resources and its population. This is the context in which the USAID/Senegal strategy was developed. The overarching goal of the U.S. assistance program to Senegal is to improve the quality of life of the Senegalese people through a process of long-term development that is equitable, participatory, self-reliant, and environmentally sustainable. USAID/Senegal has adopted a strategic goal of increasing private sector incomes derived from sustainable exploitation of natural resources. Given the complex interactions among population growth, degradation of the natural resource base, and income growth, emphasis is placed on increasing income per capita in the long run."

Achievement of this goal is structured around four Strategic Objectives

1 Decreased family size The strategy addresses both demand and supply aspects of family planning through both public and private sector mechanisms, with significant differences in emphasis and timing between programs designed to benefit urban and rural clientele. The primary strategic focus in urban areas is on service delivery, and the primary focus in rural areas is on increasing family planning awareness and approval.

2 Increased crop productivity in zones of reliable rainfall The strategy relies on exploiting agricultural potential in Senegal's southern half where reliable rainfall totalling 400 mm per year is available in four years out of five. Through a combined program to enhance soil productivity and increase the use of adapted technology, USAID/Senegal is assisting the GOS to increase production of cereals in those zones.

3 Increased value of tree production Through a combined program to plant more trees and to conserve existing trees, USAID/Senegal is assisting the GOS to increase the value of tree production. In March 1995, the Mission requested approval from USAID/Washington to consolidate this Strategic Objective with No (2) above.

4 Increased liberalization of the market The strategy is to encourage further liberalization of the market for natural resource-based production. Through a process of decreased government regulation and increased private activity, USAID/Senegal is assisting the GOS to increase the value of crop production marketed by the private sector, principally through privatization of the marketing of domestic rice.

New projects started during the period 1991-1994 Natural Resources-Based Agricultural Research Project (685-0285) in FY 91, Senegal Child Survival/Family Planning (685-0286), Senegal AIDS Prevention and Control (685-0306), Kaolack Agricultural Enterprise Development (685-0302), and Senegal Elections Assistance (685-0303) Projects in FY 92, and Community-Based Natural Resources Management Project (685-0305) in FY 93

Non-project assistance provided during the period 1991-1994 PL 480 Title III in FY 91 and 92, and Rice Structural Adjustment Program (14 million dollars) in FY 94

Total U S assistance during the period 1991-1994 135.4 million dollars, of which 89.5 million dollars for project assistance, 23.5 million dollars for non-project assistance, 21.8 million dollars under PL 480, and 0.6 million dollars under regional programs

### C USAID/Senegal, a Country Experimental Laboratory

In response to USAID/Washington's call to "reinvent" the Agency, USAID/Senegal volunteered to be a Country Experimental Laboratory to experiment with new ways of doing USAID's business

A Task Force, composed of individuals representing the various offices of the Mission, was formed to (1) develop a new organizational structure incorporating teams designed to achieve the objectives of the CPSP, and (2) identify processes and procedures that need to change in order to function in the proposed new structure. In its "Framework for Reengineering" report, approved by the Mission Director in July 1994, the Task Force proposed a new structure: three Strategic Objective Teams (SOTs) and one Cross-Cutting and Targets of Opportunity (CAT) Team, responsible for the conception, design, implementation and evaluation of all activities relating to USAID/Senegal's strategic objectives, in addition, a Core Team will provide overall policy direction and support services to the SOTs and CAT team. Each team is led by a Coach.

The SOTs and the CAT Team are composed of Strategy Activity Implementation Teams (SAITs) who are responsible for specific activities within the general objective of their respective SOT or CAT Team. They have full and part time members who represent most of the functions (contracting, financial management and technical) required for the team to achieve its results. Only legal and program functions are not represented on the teams.

The new structure was put in place when the Mission moved into its new office building, on February 27, 1995.



## LESSONS LEARNED FROM USAID/SENEGAL'S HISTORY

Trying to draw lessons from the past thirty five years of USAID presence in Senegal, so that they may be used in planning the future, is not an easy task, mainly because the stage and the circumstances have changed considerably during these thirty five years

The stage, in the early 1960s, was brighter than it is today, and the circumstances appeared less complicated

Unlike many African countries, Senegal's independence was not preceded by violent revolution. In 1961 the country was the administrative center of the former French West African territories, with a much too large and well-established bureaucracy<sup>3</sup>, and a relatively well-developed network of transport and industrial infrastructure. The population was approximately 3.5 million, population growth approximated GDP growth, and per capita income remained stable.

The first U.S. bilateral assistance program to Senegal (1961-1970) began with a modest program made up of discrete grant funded technical assistance projects and feasibility studies, and Food for Peace donations.

At this time it was generally believed that technical assistance to Africa would be temporary, and that the United States knew what had to be done. Regarding agriculture, "it was assumed uncritically that available technologies were appropriate to African conditions and that they would diffuse rapidly if seeded through agricultural extension services."<sup>4</sup>

This first phase of U.S. bilateral assistance has little to offer in terms of lessons learned: program implementation was slow and shaky, a "learn-as-you-go" experience for both USAID and GOS.

When U.S. bilateral programs to Senegal resumed in 1974-75, the stage and the circumstances had dramatically changed: the country had suffered a series of severe droughts, the progressive southern shift of rainfall zones had severely affected Senegal's most heavily cropped areas, GOS had embarked on heavy borrowing, the balance of payment deficit was high, the gap between population growth and GDP growth was widening, and donors were pouring aid into Senegal.

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<sup>3</sup>Dakar was the administrative capital of French-speaking West Africa, after independence, it became the capital of a small country with limited natural resources.

<sup>4</sup>"An Assessment of AID Activities to Promote Agricultural and Rural Development in Sub-Saharan Africa", AID Evaluation Special Study No. 54.

USAID's strategy to help tackle these problems reflected the trend of the moment in U S foreign assistance "New Directions" to meet basic human needs. A series of integrated rural development projects were launched, targeted to low-income groups.

When the 1975-1980 assistance program was evaluated in 1980, the shortcomings of integrated development appeared:

- Most of the regional development agencies (RDAs), which constituted the major Senegalese instrument of integrated rural development and agricultural modernization, and channelled foreign assistance for these sectoral activities, had serious problems and were inefficient.

- In the Peanut Basin, the cooperative structure created by the government to channel credit and off-farm inputs, and to help market crops (some 2,200 coops, of which very few were formed from any traditional or local organization) was in total disarray.

- The integrated approach was questioned. "In most of our projects supplemental activities have been added-on to project design. Health, WID and Promotion Humaine are the major supplemental activities. How effective are they? Should, and how could, they be more integrated within the project? Some evidence indicates that they are isolated elements and in one case detrimental to the main project operations. The role of these add-ons needs to be closely looked at."<sup>5</sup>

- USAID projects were too insular, too inward-looking and self-contained. They were prototypic, and their time pay-out was not in the short or even medium term. They did not appear to be part of an overall strategy in which all the various donors relate and exchange information, and the adequacy of project goals to meet national needs was not obvious.

The Joint Assessment of 1980 thus brought about a series of changes in USAID's approach to development assistance in Senegal: better coordination with other donors through a Consultative Group, consolidation of USAID activities in three geographic regions, reduction of the number of projects, greater emphasis placed on non-project assistance.

Again, these changes reflected not only the conclusions of the joint assessment in Senegal, but also the general trends of bilateral and multilateral assistance in the early 1980s. In the case of U S foreign assistance, the Agency, with reduced personnel and limited financial resources, was moving from a labor-intensive targeted project approach to a policy reform approach through non-project assistance. The new

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<sup>5</sup>Joint Assessment of U S Assistance Programs in Senegal, Annex, 1980

programs, subordinated to, and conditioned on, key systems reforms and follow-through performance factors, financed under the fast disbursing Economic Support Fund, would also address the short-term fiscal needs of recipient countries

But, despite a plethora of development plans, investment strategies, reform plans and one of the highest per capita aid flows in the world from both bilateral and multilateral donors, Senegal's situation by the mid-1980s was grim, and its problems seemed close to intractable. The economy was stagnant, with the lowest GDP growth of any African state not affected by war or civil strife, agricultural production per capita was still declining, unemployment rising, food imports were steadily growing, and population growth rate was estimated at more than 3 percent per year.

There were a number of factors causing this situation, some of which were external (droughts, international economic situation). But the critical factors, the ones that the GOS could change, were internal counter-productive economic policies, high emphasis on consumption (public and private), inadequate attention to productivity and discipline, environmental deterioration due to human activities, etc.

Thus, massive program assistance to support policy reform was not as effective as had been expected, in spite of all the conditionality measures and monitoring processes put in place by the donor community.

Numerous reviews, studies, and assessments have been undertaken by USAID, France, the World Bank, etc. to analyze Senegal's adjustment programs. The findings and conclusions, while acknowledging that many positive and institutional changes have occurred, point out a number of causes for the shortcoming of these programs, among which those cited by Elliot Berg<sup>6</sup>

- Lack of implementation due to "erosion of Senegalese political will and capacity to implement reforms because of the aid environment within which reform has operated: lots of donors, lots of money, and a no-sanctions/soft-budget-constraint atmosphere."

- The reform attempts incorporate too many conflicting objectives, are carried out with too few policy instruments, are subject to pressures from strongly entrenched interest groups, lack of widespread support within the administration.

In February 1991 USAID/Senegal's CPSP for FY 1992-1997 concluded that "financial stabilization alone, and the limited structural adjustment that has occurred to date, are insufficient to move Senegal onto a significantly higher growth path. Moreover,

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<sup>6</sup>Adjustment Postponed: Economic Policy Reform in Senegal in the 1980s, by Elliot Berg, October 1990.

financial stabilization and structural adjustment are very broad goals which are beyond USAID's manageable interest operating on its own " The three major objectives (promote a dynamic market economy, increase cereals production, improve family health) that USAID/Senegal had long sought to achieve were too broad and out of reach

The CPSP proposed to concentrate its focus on the fundamental problem that Senegal has been faced with since independence - reaching a balance between population growth and natural resources

" The overarching goal of the U S assistance program to Senegal would be to improve the quality of life of the Senegalese people through a process of long-term development that is equitable, participatory, self-reliant, and environmentally sustainable "

In view of the overall limited results of Senegalese structural reform programs, the Mission's policy dialogue would address macroeconomic issues on a more selective basis, focusing on those macroeconomic and policy issues that related most strongly to its population and natural resources strategy

Once again, USAID/Senegal faithfully followed the new approach established by the Agency in the late 1980s the "Strategy for Sustainable Development", which promotes "support for sustainable and participatory development, an emphasis on partnerships, and the use of integrated approaches to promoting development" The fundamental thrust of USAID programs would "aim at building indigenous capacity, enhancing participation, and encouraging accountability, transparency, decentralization, and the empowerment of communities and individuals "<sup>7</sup>

The CPSP strategy stressed both the need to develop greater ownership of reform on the part of the Senegalese, and the need to build constituencies for reform from the bottom up The CPSP, however, said little as to how these needs would be addressed

- Four strategic objectives were defined decreased family size, increased crop productivity in zones of reliable rainfall, increased value of tree production, and increased liberalization of the market These objectives contemplated Mission's support to GOS, and very little was said about partnership, participation, etc Also, the Agency's new emphasis on integrated approaches, accountability, and transparency went unaddressed in the CPSP

- Under each objective, targets retained were those considered within USAID's

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<sup>7</sup>"Strategies for Sustainable Development, U S Agency for International Development, March 1994

manageable interest and financial ability to achieve during the 1992-1997 time frame. Under each target, strategies, approaches and actions were discussed, and only those considered realistic, feasible, and within USAID's reach were retained. A number of strategies, approaches and actions used by USAID/Senegal in the past were discarded because they were considered wrong, unrealistic or overambitious.

If this CPSP were to be characterized, the words cautious and humble seem appropriate. Caution was indeed called for. In 1992 and 1993, Senegal came very close to financial collapse on account of political concerns. The 1992-1993 election year consumed resources and energy, postponing serious attention by GOS to pressing development issues, and civil unrest in the Casamance disrupted development activities.

Senegal entered 1994 without any World Bank and IMF adjustment agreements. The absence of such agreements led to the suspension of financial support from other major donors. Eventually, the devaluation of the CFA Franc in January 1994 prompted donors to resume their assistance to Senegal, and largely eliminated the single most important price impediment to the economic development of the country.

USAID/Senegal is now preparing for the planning and design of its next five-year assistance program. In-depth assessments will be undertaken in various sectors (this history of USAID/Senegal will constitute a background document to accompany these assessments), consultations with partners and customers will be organized.

At the same time USAID/Senegal, as a "reinvention" laboratory, is devoting "large amounts of scarce staff time to issues ranging from reorganizing staff into teams to training those teams to operate effectively, from building a culture of collaboration with partners and customers to developing appropriate internal delegations of authority to empower staff, and from preparing detailed new job descriptions to designing efficient computer-based administrative processes. Both reinventing USAID/Dakar and putting in place systems that will allow us to manage for results are 'highest priorities.' They also are closely linked. But they call upon the same set of scarce resources."

The conjunction of the reengineering effort with the drafting of the next program will certainly put much stress on USAID/Senegal staff. "Reinventing" ways of doing business is a new experience to everybody. Assessing the various sectors of the economy of Senegal is not new, many assessments have been conducted in the past which contain a wealth of useful information.

Given below are some of the observations found in a number of assessments conducted in preparation for previous CDSS, these observations may be relevant to the activities of the next program cycle, they will certainly require further checking during the forthcoming assessments to ascertain if they are still valid.

► Does too much conditionality hurt?

In program assistance, conditionality measures have been seen as a major leverage to encourage the GOS to undertake policy reforms. However, according to the CPSP, limited structural adjustment has occurred to date. Is that to say that the conditionalities attached to bilateral and multilateral agreements were not as effective as they were expected to be?

"Too much was tried too fast. Conditionalities or 'actions required' were excessive in number and complexity. And despite evidence of administrative indigestion, the number of conditionalities increased in each SAL (The tendency is reversed in SAL IV, which is more narrowly focussed)."

"Explicit conditionality is frequently inappropriate, usually ineffective, and sometimes counterproductive. It is clearly inappropriate in three sets of circumstances: when institutional reform is involved, when the conditional action is not entirely within the control of the government, and when technical consensus is lacking. Yet in Senegal, conditionality was imposed in numerous instances where these circumstances prevailed."

"The replacement of explicit, ex-ante conditionality by implicit and ex-post understandings will reduce game playing, encourage true dialogue, and allow local ownership to develop."<sup>8</sup>

"Constructive [policy] dialogue requires better policy research and analysis by AID and host country participants and an approach based on collaboration, experimentation, and learning rather than on conditionality and confrontation."<sup>9</sup>

"However, there is a real danger of 'over-conditionality'. With four different institutions monitoring perhaps half a dozen reforms in each of three or four different areas, the quantity of required reform measures becomes unmanageable. The GOS is asked to perform in too many areas simultaneously, reducing the chances of success in any one area and creating an all-or-nothing situation in which failure in a few areas leads to the complete

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<sup>8</sup>Adjustment Postponed: Economic Policy Reform in Senegal in the 1980s, by Elliot Berg Associates, October 1990

<sup>9</sup>An Assessment of AID Activities to Promote Agricultural and Rural Development in Sub-Saharan Africa, AID Special Study No 54, April 1988

withdrawal of funds <sup>10</sup>

► To give or not to give is that the question?

One reason for slow progress in Senegal's development seems to be the abundance of foreign aid

"We find that the main underlying reason for lack of implementation is the erosion of Senegalese political will and capacity to implement reforms because of the aid environment within which reform has operated lots of donors, lots of money, and a no-sanction/soft-budget-constraint atmosphere Two dilemmas exist The first is that Senegal may need more aid to address its postponed adjustment decisions, while aid levels are already so substantial that they undermine the will to reform "

"The chief problem is that aid which is too readily available has weakened the key element of political responsibility - the need to make choices "

"The reduction in aid volume is necessary to increase Senegal's self-reliance and reduce the negative side effects of large aid inflows, notably their distorting effects on the development of political responsibility and on institutional development No country can avoid severe distortions when aid amounts to nearly 20 percent of its national income <sup>11</sup>

" These influences - when coupled with the very high level of donor per capita development funding available for Senegal in the 1980s - have meant that senior Senegalese officials often have had the luxury of being reactive to donor proposals In many instances, economic policy making and 'planning' have been limited to official decision-making on how to exploit the most vulnerable external funding sources "

"Until relatively recently, this approach usually permitted the government to sustain a 'business as usual' approach to policy formulation and sectoral development Collaterally, the cutting edges of policy reform agendas promoted by the more aggressive major donors have often been blunted or their effects avoided merely by government resort to exploiting points of disunity between the donors until the donor policy consensus disintegrated Another tactic was simply to agree in principle to a difficult policy change and

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<sup>10</sup>Making Aid Work - An Analysis of Aid Programs and Aid Policy Problems in the Republic of Senegal by Ellen A Goldstein, May 1984

<sup>11</sup>Adjustment Postponed , by Elliot Berg Associates

then stall on its implementation until the donors themselves dropped key elements, accepted compromises in implementation, and/or went back to 'moving money' in Senegal for other reasons having little to do with government adherence to the agreed agenda of policy changes "<sup>12</sup>

"Some argue that it is precisely the outpouring of aid which keeps Senegal on the edge of financial disaster. They believe that having France - and in recent years, the IMF, the World Bank and the U S - always available to shore up the Senegalese economy has created a 'cushion' which allows the GOS to ignore serious economic adjustment. "

"Because a cushion of foreign aid had allowed the GOS to avoid economic adjustment for so long, one might be tempted to conclude that the best policy for donors to follow in order to promote such adjustment would be to withhold additional aid. If aid were withheld, Senegal would be forced into rapid, radical economic adjustment - left to either 'sink or swim'. Those who believe that Senegal would, out of necessity, 'swim', overestimate both the speed at which adjustments can occur given political constraints, and the degree of adjustment possible in the short- to medium-term, given the scarcity of resources "<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>12</sup>Macroeconomic and Sectoral Adjustment Programs in Senegal, by John H Eriksen, Ithaca International Limited, May 1990

<sup>13</sup>Making Aid Work ,by Ellen A Goldstein, May 1984



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\* USAID/Washington Strategies for Sustainable Development, March 1994

## HISTORY OF USAID/SENEGAL

## COMPARISON OF USAID/SENEGAL STRATEGIES

## LESSONS LEARNED

## A COMPARISON OF USAID/SENEGAL STRATEGIES

Trying to compare strategies followed by USAID/Senegal during the past thirty five years, in order to draw lessons for the future, is arduous, for one basic reason the stage and the circumstances changed from one period to another, and there may be little basis for comparison between two sets of circumstances. The strategy followed in one particular period was determined by a wide variety of factors and circumstances prevailing at the time the strategy was being designed or put in place.

In addition to changing circumstances, there were a number of factors which constrained the Mission:

- Above all, the Mission had to follow the focus, the emphasis, the trends set by the Congress and USAID/Washington. What activities were designed and implemented depended on where the money was in the Agency budget.

- Within this framework, the Mission tried to respond to GOS' own priorities and constraints, whether political, economic or social. Given the limited resources available to the Mission, that response was necessarily partial and insufficient.

- The Mission also had to take into account what other donors were doing in Senegal, so as to avoid duplication, redundancy or irrelevancy<sup>14</sup>.

- Other factors such as timely rain or drought, good or bad crop, world market prices, political or social unrest, etc. further affected the effectiveness of the strategy.

Once possible USAID interventions have been identified (those where the comparative advantage of U.S. assistance will be best applied), and a program designed, the

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<sup>14</sup>That was not always the case in the past. The Joint Assessment of 1980 commented that USAID projects were too insular, too inward-looking and self-contained. Some were redundant due to the lack of collaboration with the GOS and other donors, and some had no linkage to macro-economic issues.

Mission still has to "sell" it to Washington! <sup>15</sup>

The following pages present a brief comparison of strategies followed by USAID/Senegal. This is a quick reference, descriptive summary, and not a detailed discussion of the strategies, of their differences, and the reasons for the changes made in those strategies.

For purposes of comparison, the strategies followed by the Mission during the periods 1961-1970 and 1970-1975 are hard to appraise: there is little information available on the first period, and little relevance to the bilateral program of the regional strategy followed during the second period. An overview of the strategies followed during the period 1975-1995 seems to indicate that, lightly put, the Mission's attitude has gone from "We can help Senegal develop - our way", to "We can help Senegal develop - not necessarily Senegal's way", to "We want to help Senegal develop - but which way?"

1 From approximately a dozen projects in 1980, the Mission went to some fifty projects by the mid-1980s, cut back to a dozen projects in the late 1980s, and is maintaining its portfolio at that level in 1995.

2 The Mission went (a) from a few integrated rural development projects in the late 1970s trying to do too many things in too many geographic areas too fast, (b) to too many activities in the mid-1980s trying to do too many things in too many geographic areas too fast, (c) to fewer, selected activities in the 1990s closely related to its population and natural resources strategy, specific targets have been identified, benchmark indicators have been defined, performance targets have been established. (All along, USAID has had in Senegal a lead role among the donors in the area of family planning, it also presently plays a lead role in the areas of environment and natural resources management.)

3 There was a shift from technical assistance projects cum PL 480 programs in the mid-1970s<sup>16</sup>, without linkages to macro-economic issues, to a combination of project and non-project assistance supporting structural adjustment and financial stabilization. In the mid-1980s, the Mission had a balanced program of project and non-project assistance, the latter reached a peak of 75 percent in FY 1990 before going down again.

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<sup>15</sup>Most recently, the Mission is also facing an internal problem beyond its control: an extremely tight operating budget, which limits its ability to carry out the U.S. assistance program in Senegal.

<sup>16</sup>PL 480 programs have been part of the U.S. assistance program since 1961.

4 There was a shift from discrete, technical assistance projects, which were prototypic, too insular, too self-contained, to sectoral projects designed in cooperation with GOS, emphasizing policy dialogue and institution building. There is now more coordination between USAID, GOS and other donors, both bilateral and multilateral. The World Bank and the IMF spearhead donor cooperation with GOS in the areas of structural reform and budget support.

5 By the late 1980s, however, the Mission felt that financial stabilization and structural adjustment were very broad goals beyond USAID's manageable interest, and decided to narrow its program focus on macro-economic and policy issues relating most strongly to USAID's population and natural resources strategy. The strategic objectives (promotion of dynamic market economy, increase in cereals production, and improved family health) were also found to be too broad. Achievement of 80 percent food self-sufficiency was considered out of reach, increasing rice production in the Senegal River Valley was a high-cost approach. Maternal and child activities should be limited to those elements most closely related to Family Planning activities.

6 USAID/Senegal chose to retrench in fewer, selected activities, its strategy for the period 1992-1997 "stresses both the need to develop greater ownership of reform on the part of the Senegalese, and the need to build constituencies for reform from the bottom up."

7 Until the late 1980s, the goal of U.S. assistance was consistently presented as Senegal's food self-sufficiency. In the late 1980s, it changed to increase per capita growth and food security. By the early 1990s, the goal is to improve the quality of life of Senegalese people through an increase of per capita income.

## B LESSONS LEARNED FROM PAST STRATEGIES

### 1961-1970 STRATEGY Increase food production

**Approach** Short-term Technical Assistance and PL 480 programs  
Dollar and local currency projects

**LESSONS** \* *Slow and shaky program start, many projects attempted in agriculture, school construction and participant training*  
\* *Identification of rice production as an area of emphasis, and the Casamance as an area of special geographic interest*

1970-1975<sup>17</sup> STRATEGY Increase food production

Approach Multi-lateral programs, promote institution building  
Regional programs implemented through two new regional institutions, OMVS and WARDA

LESSONS

- \* *Regional institutions in West Africa are weak development partners*
- \* *Countries inexperienced in implementing programs requiring high-degree of delicate and well-orchestrated coordination to effectively utilize donors' inputs*
- \* *Countries need to play increasing role in programming aspects of regional development policies and priorities*

1975-1980<sup>18</sup> STRATEGY Achieve food self-sufficiency

Approach Integrated rural development projects and PL 480 programs Targets, introduce improved agricultural technical packages, promote irrigated agriculture, livestock and range management, and establish rural health delivery systems  
Initially, short-term projects, followed by longer-term projects Projects in five geographic areas

LESSONS

- \* *Low productivity of Senegal's capital and labor resources is at the heart of Senegal's development problems*
- \* *Need to concentrate on sectoral activities*
- \* *Need to improve organization and management of Senegal's physical, natural and human resources*
- \* *Projects are too insular, sometimes redundant need for greater collaboration with GOS and other donors*
- \* *Build linkages between individual projects and macro-economic and social needs of Senegalese society*
- \* *Concentrate activities in regions where USAID has invested in order to maximize investment returns*
- \* *Supplemental activities added-on to projects not fully integrated, may be detrimental to projects' operations*

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<sup>17</sup>Bilateral program discontinued around 1970, except for PL 480

<sup>18</sup>Bilateral program reestablished in 1974-75

\* *Projects should be oriented towards increasing productivity rather than increasing production, especially in the rural sector*

\* *Train rural residents for the construction and maintenance of rural infrastructure and new productive assets*

\* *Involve beneficiaries in the design, management, implementation and financing of projects. Train beneficiaries to assume these responsibilities*

\* *Increase program efficiency by designing more flexible projects*

\* *Reduce reliance on public services to increase rural production*

\* *Learn how less regulated markets work for credit, inputs and crop sales, how they may be used as instruments of development policy*

1983-1986 STRATEGY Achieve food self-sufficiency, defined as Senegal's capacity to feed its people, by domestic production and storage, and by trade, even in drought years, by the close of the century

Approach Policy dialogue, institutional development, promotion of private sector, technology transfer Two programs

(1) Agriculture program to increase and diversify production and trade. Targets progressive decontrol and commercialization of rural production, development of more effective agronomic practices, increase of cultivated land, improved soil, water and fuelwood resources management

(2) Human development program to improve nutrition and general access to family health, in order to support production efforts and to reduce fertility rates. Targets establishment of a model rural health care delivery system, formulation of a national population policy, development of a national nutrition policy, improved access to primary health care, enhanced social and economic standing of women

Major changes from the 1975-1980 strategy: greater use of non-project assistance and local currency to stabilize

Senegal's balance of payments and to support policy reforms, greater participation of local producer groups and private sector, greater geographic concentration (activities in three instead of five regions) and fewer projects (number reduced from 34 to 13), better coordination with GOS and other donors

### LESSONS

\* *In the past, focus was on geographic area development, however, little progress was made towards improving overall agricultural production and reversal of environmental degradation - in fact, the situation had worsened. Although focus of the USAID program was appropriate, it was conducted within an inappropriate policy atmosphere. GOS adoption of New Agricultural Policy (NAP) made this program obsolete.*

\* *Need to broaden knowledge in key areas of the economy, such as constraints to greater role of the private sector, private sector interactions, potential for alternative cash crops to peanuts, etc.*

### 1986-1988 STRATEGY

Achieve food self-sufficiency, defined as Senegal's capacity to ~~capacities~~ provide people, by domestic production and storage, and by trade, even in drought years. In the short-term, achieve positive per capita increase of GDP

### Approach

Four-pronged strategy: (1) support to GOS structural adjustment and reform measures, (2) support to reduce institutional and infrastructural problems which impede the growth of agricultural production, (3) support for income-generating activities which contribute both to environmental protection and increased production, (4) improve the productive capacity of rural workers and the quality of life through the provision of health and family planning services.

Three subsidiary targets: (1) improved economic performance through structural reform, (2) minimum 5 percent increase per year in cereals production through timely and adequate provision of inputs, water and marketing, (3) decrease in fertility rate through family planning.



Major changes from previous strategy emphasis on removing constraints to agricultural production (rather than on area-specific interventions), greater emphasis on income generation in the rural sector, launching of an important program of reforestation and soil regeneration, reduced emphasis on public sector institutional growth

Program evenly divided between project and non-project assistance. New generation of activities to help implement the NAP, designed to develop technology, transfer technology to farmers and rural enterprises, and support production expansion through free market structures. Lower priority activities phased out (number of projects reduced from 47 in 1984 to 12 in 1988)

#### LESSONS

- \* *Need for consistency and selectivity in setting conditionality*
- \* *Need for better understanding of farmer and business behaviour in key policy areas*
- \* *Need for coherence between non-project and project assistance*
- \* *Need for close donor coordination*
- \* *USAID involved in too many geographic areas and too many activities (from agricultural production, to cereals pricing, to water buffalo traction, to salt water distillation) to effectively manage and provide measurable impacts*

#### 1988-1990 STRATEGY

Increase per capita growth and food security through a process of financial stabilization, structural reform, and selected project activities in key areas of agriculture, natural resources, health, and family planning

#### Approach

Strategic priorities assist GOS to (1) develop and implement reforms at the macroeconomic level, in agriculture, and in family health, (2) reduce institutional, infrastructural, and environmental constraints to the growth of agricultural production, and (3) expand delivery of health, nutrition, and family planning services that increase human productivity and the quality of life

Focus of policy agenda (1) improved fiscal performance and allocation of resources to productive sectors, (2)

restoration of liquidity and reform of the banking sector, (3) implementation of a coherent strategy for reasonable food self-reliance, (4) reduction in the role of agricultural parastatals, (5) privatization of agricultural input distribution, (6) liberalization of cereals marketing, and (7) development of a replicable model of self-supporting, community-based primary health care that includes comprehensive programs of child survival and voluntary family planning

Focus of assistance to agriculture sector (1) extension of low-cost irrigation and water management techniques, (2) expansion of reforestation and conservation activities, (3) promotion of private production and marketing of agricultural inputs and outputs, and (4) strengthening of agricultural research and technology, especially in support of cereals-based farming systems in both rainfed and irrigated areas

Project assistance in family health emphasizes improved child survival through immunization, oral rehydration and improved nutrition, and expanded family planning primarily through increased child spacing

Three strategic objectives promote a dynamic market economy, increase cereals production, improve family health

#### LESSONS

\* *Financial stabilization and limited structural adjustment achieved are insufficient to bring about significant higher growth*

\* *Financial stabilization and structural adjustment are very broad goals beyond USAID's manageable interest*

\* *Promotion of dynamic market economy, increased cereals production, and improved family health are also too broad objectives*

\* *Achievement of 80 percent food self-sufficiency was too broad, out of reach*

\* *Previous approaches failed sufficiently to focus on the negative effects of increasing cereals production in the short run without sufficient regard to maintaining a solid base of soil productivity*

\* *Previous approaches failed to focus on the complex and shifting production and employment strategies which rural*

*households adopt to maximize income from available resources*

*\* Both GOS and USAID placed too much emphasis on increasing rice production in the Senegal River valley, this proved to be a high-cost approach whose primary constraint was not land or water, but capital, management, and entrepreneurship*

*\* Although family planning remains inextricably linked with maternal and child health activities, there is a need to focus on those elements most closely related to decreasing family size*

1992-1997 STRATEGY Improve quality of life of Senegalese people through long-term, equitable, participatory, self-reliant, and environmentally sustainable development process

Approach Strategic goal increase private sector incomes derived from sustainable exploitation of natural resources  
Long-term objective increase per capita income

Four strategic objectives (1) Decreased family size, the strategy addresses both demand and supply aspects of family planning through both public and private sector mechanisms (2) Increased crop productivity in zones of reliable rainfall, through enhanced soil productivity and increased use of adapted technology (3) Increased value of tree production through the planting of more trees and the conservation of existing trees (this strategic objective has been consolidated with No 2) (4) Increased liberalization of market through decreased government regulation and increased private activity

HISTORY OF USAID/SENEGAL  
LIST OF USAID/SENEGAL MISSION DIRECTORS

1960 - 1961 Jack H VAUGHN, Mission Director (\*)  
1961 - 1962 Robert B BLACK, Mission Director  
1963 Jacob L CRANE, Program Officer  
1964 - 1965 ?  
1966 - 1968 William M BLAISDELL, AID Operations Officer  
1969 - 1970 Walter J SHERWIN (\*\*), AID Operations Officer  
1971 - 1975 David MCADAMS, Regional Development Officer  
1975 - 1979 Norman Schoonover, Mission Director  
1979 - 1984 David Shear, Mission Director  
1984 - 1989 Sarah Jane Littlefield, Mission Director  
1990 - 1994 Julius E Coles, Mission Director  
1994 - Anne M Williams, Mission Director

(\*) ICA Representative to the Federation of Mali and Senegal, then to the Republic of Senegal, then USAID Mission Director

(\*\*) Alfred M HURT was Director of Regional Activities, CWAORA

List of obligations (AD,ESF,AEPRP, et PL 480) 1961 - 1994  
(In thousands of U S dollars )

<u>Fiscal Year</u>	<u>Project Assistance (DA)</u>	<u>Non-Project Assistance (ESF/AEPRP)</u>	<u>PL-480<sup>A</sup></u>	<u>Régional<sup>B</sup></u>	<u>OMVS/OMVG</u>	<u>Total Obligations FY 1961/94</u>
1961-65*	9,600		4,300			13,900
1966	1,400		1,300			2,700
1967	900		5,600			6,500
1968	1,100		1,500			2,600
1969	1,000		2,100			3,100
1970	800		3,400			4,200
1971	600		2,600			3,200
1972	800		1,100			1,900
1973	900		1,600			2,500
1974	900		7,900			8,800
1975	5,643		2,100			7,743
1976	1,938		1,465			3,403
1977	8,554		2,954			11,508
1978	9,144		6,625			15,769
1979	12,140		5,487			17,627
1980	10,000		13,565	1,528		25,093
1981	14,800		21,483	2,063	4,604	42,950
1982	16,500		13,190	1,601	3,012	34,303
1983	14,058	5,000	13,367	1,860	10,033	44,318
1984	22,885	10,000	15,905	1,247	3,528	53,565
1985	22,104	15,000	6,661	3,070	4,000	50,835
1986	20,375	26,484 <sup>C</sup>	12,943	1,152	1,500	62,454
1987	18,733	11,075	12,677	2,106	1,500	46,091
1988	21,100		7,645	120	2,350	31,215
1989	23,972	24,200 <sup>D</sup>	5,000	141	1,000	54,313
1990	10,500	26,500	5,000	120		42,120
1991	17,970	6,500 <sup>E</sup>	10,000	191		34,661
1992	30,000 <sup>G</sup>	3,000 <sup>F</sup>	8,000	125		41,125
1993	22,350 <sup>H</sup>		3,800	216		26,366
1994	19,135	14,000 <sup>I</sup>		157		33,292
TOTAL	339,901	141,759	199,267	15,697	31,527	728,151

\* No assistance prior to FY 1961

1 Includes World Food Program and ocean transportation until 1988 and only ocean transportation starting 1989

2 Excludes OMVS/OMVG programs

3 AEPRP-1 (\$14 0 million) and ESF-IV (\$12,484 million)

4 ESF-VI (9 7 million) and ESF-VII (14 5 million)

5 AEPRP-II (5 5 million) and ESF-VII (1 million)

6 ESF-VII (3 million and 1 million)

7 Includes reobligations of DFA and SDP no-year funds

8 Includes Child Survival (CHS) Earmarks (1 8 million)

## LIST OF USAID/SENEGAL PROJECTS

NUMBER	T I T L E	BEG/END DATE (FY)	LOCATION	DOLLAR AMOUNT (000)
685-001	Water Resources Survey & Developpment	65-70	Unknown	425
685-002	Development Loan Bank (see 685-013)	-	-	-
685-003	Secondary Schools	63-67	Kaolack/Dakar/Thies	174
685-004	General Participant Training	61-69	Nationwide	209
685-005	Technical & Feasibility Studies	61-68	Senegal River Basin Casamance Region	121
685-006	Seed Improvement	63-67	Bambey	21
685-007	(Project cancelled)	-	-	-
685-008	Rural Extension Centers	64-68	Nationwide	363
685-009	(Project cancelled)	-	-	-
685-010	(Project cancelled)	-	-	-
685-011	(Project cancelled)	-	-	-
685-012	(Project cancelled)	-	-	-
685-013	Development Loan Bank (ex 685-002)	63	Dakar	24
685-014	Poultry Research & Extension	64-69	Unknown	31
685-015	(Project cancelled)	-	-	-
685-016	(Project cancelled)	-	-	-
685-017	Special Self-Help Development	68-80	Nationwide	827
685-018	First World Festival of Negro Arts	66-67	Dakar	118
685-019	General Agricultural Survey	66-67	Casamance Region	15
685-020	(Project not approved)	-	-	-
685-021	(Project not approved)	-	-	-
685-022	(Project not approved)	-	-	-
685-023	Agric Development in Casamance Peginon	66-72	Casamance Region	574
685-0201	Cereals Production, Phase I	75-79	Peanut Basin	3,735
685-0202	Range & Livestock Development	75-85	Bakel Area	4,882
685-0205	Casamance Regional Development	78-86	Casamance Region	21,413
685-0208	Bakel Small Irrigated Perimeters	77-86	Bakel Area	7,815

NUMBER	T I T L E	BEG/END DATE (FY)	LOCATION	DOLLAR AMOUNT (000)
685-0209	Grain Storage	77-84	Nationwide	4,670
685-0210	Sine Saloum Rural Health Care	77-84	Fatick/Kaolack Regs (ex-Sine Saloum)	3,247
685-0217	Family Health I	79-85	Cap-Vert/Thies/ Fatick/Kaolack/ Casamance Regions	2,189
685-0218	SAED Training	79-86	Senegal River Basin	3,812
685-0219	Fuelwood Production	79-85	Thies Region	3,367
685-0222	YMCA/ORT Youth Job Development	79-85	Dakar	3,235
685-0223	Agricultural Research and Planning	81-88	Senegal River Basin Fatick/Kaolack Regs/ Casamance Region	5,063
685-0224	SODESP Livestock	79-84	Sylvo-Pastoral Zone	5,051
685-0226	Patte d'Oie Housing Improvement	79-88	Dakar Area	1,265
685-0233	National Plan for Land Use & Development	81-85	Nationwide	2,000
685-0235	Cereals Production, Phase II	80-91	Peanut Basin	6,563
685-0239	Caritas Village Development	79-83	Mbour	212
685-0240	Lowland Fisheries	79-82	Senegal River Basin	164
685-0242	Rural Health/Child Survival II	84-93	Fatick/Kaolack Regs	10,244
685-0243	AFRICARE Reforestation	79-83	Fatick/Kaolack/Thi'	105
685-0247	AFRICARE/PC Village Woodlot	80-83	Bambey/Diourbel	168
685-0248	Family Health and Population	85-93	Nationwide	21,310
685-0250	Millet Transformation	81-86	Nationwide	940
685-0254	Fisheries Resource Assessment	81-84	Dakar	142
685-0255	Information & Management Research	81-84	Dakar	98
685-0256	ENEA Rural Management Training	82-88	Dakar	3,113
685-0260	Community and Enterprise Development	84-94	Fatick/Kaolack/ Thies/Diourbel/ Dakar/Ziguinchor/ Kolda/Tambacounda	15,014
685-0269	Agricultural Production Support	87-92	Nationwide	3,994
685-0280	Irrigation & Water Management I	85-91	Bakel Area	6,008

NUMBER	T I T L E	BEG/END DATE (FY)	LOCATION	DOLLAR AMOUNT (000)
685-0281	Transfer of Technology	85-95	Nationwide	9,963
685-0283	Reforestation	86-95	Nationwide	14,000
685-0284	PVO/NGO Support	90-98	Nationwide	20,125
685-0285	Natural Resources-Based Agric Research	91-98	Southern Senegal	12,300
685-0286	Senegal Child Survival/Family Planning	92-99	Nationwide	21,025
685-0295	Southern Zone Water Management	88-96	Southern Senegal	18,000
685-0302	Kaolack Agric Enterprise Development	92-97	Kaolack Region	8,000
685-0303	Senegal Elections Assistance	92-93	Nationwide	465
685-0305	Community-Based Nat Resources Mgmt	93-02	Nationwide	10,880
685-0306	Senegal AIDS Control & Prevention	92-98	Nationwide	9,076
685-0957	Senegal Agricultural Research II	84-92	Senegal River Basin	4,475
698-0463	Human Resources Development Assistance	88-97	Nationwide	8,657

NOTES

- 1 The above list does not include Program Development and Support (PD&S) fund, regional and centrally-funded projects, PL 480 and Non-Project assistance programs
- 2 Dollar amounts shown represent actual expenditures for completed projects, and obligations through June 1995 for active projects